Planetary Protection Knowledge Gap Closure Enabling Crewed Missions to Mars.

As focus for exploration of Mars transitions from current robotic explorers to development of crewed missions, it remains important to protect the integrity of scientific investigations at Mars, as well as protect the Earth's biosphere from any potential harmful effects from returned martian material. This is the discipline of planetary protection, and the Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) maintains the consensus international policy and guidelines on how this is implemented. Based on National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and European Space Agency (ESA) studies that began in 2001, COSPAR adopted principles and guidelines for human missions to Mars in 2008. At that point, it was clear that to move from those qualitative provisions, a great deal of work and interaction with spacecraft designers would be necessary to generate meaningful quantitative recommendations that could embody the intent of the Outer Space Treaty (Article IX) in the design of such missions. Beginning in 2016, COSPAR then sponsored a multiyear interdisciplinary meeting series to address planetary protection "knowledge gaps" (KGs) with the intent of adapting and extending the current robotic mission-focused Planetary Protection Policy to support the design and implementation of crewed and hybrid exploration missions. This article describes the outcome of the interdisciplinary COSPAR meeting series, to describe and address these KGs, as well as identify potential paths to gap closure. It includes the background scientific basis for each topic area and knowledge updates since the meeting series ended. In particular, credible solutions for KG closure are described for the three topic areas of (1) microbial monitoring of spacecraft and crew health; (2) natural transport (and survival) of terrestrial microbial contamination at Mars, and (3) the technology and operation of spacecraft systems for contamination control. The article includes a KG data table on these topic areas, which is intended to be a point of departure for making future progress in developing an end-to-end planetary protection requirements implementation solution for a crewed mission to Mars. Overall, the workshop series has provided evidence of the feasibility of planetary protection implementation for a crewed Mars mission, given (1) the establishment of needed zoning, emission, transport, and survival parameters for terrestrial biological contamination and (2) the creation of an accepted risk-based compliance approach for adoption by spacefaring actors including national space agencies and commercial/nongovernment organizations.

A survey of International Health Regulations National Focal Points experiences in carrying out their functions.

BACKGROUND: The 2005 International Health Regulations (IHR (2005)) require States Parties to establish National Focal Points (NFPs) responsible for notifying the World Health Organization (WHO) of potential events that might constitute public health emergencies of international concern (PHEICs), such as outbreaks of novel infectious diseases. Given the critical role of NFPs in the global surveillance and response system supported by the IHR, we sought to assess their experiences in carrying out their functions. METHODS: In collaboration with WHO officials, we administered a voluntary online survey to all 196 States Parties to the IHR (2005) in Africa, Asia, Europe, and South and North America, from October to November 2019. The survey was available in six languages via a secure internet-based system. RESULTS: In total, 121 NFP representatives answered the 56-question survey; 105 in full, and an additional 16 in part, resulting in a response rate of 62% (121 responses to 196 invitations to participate). The majority of NFPs knew how to notify the WHO of a potential PHEIC, and believed they have the content expertise to carry out their functions. Respondents found training workshops organized by WHO Regional Offices helpful on how to report PHEICs. NFPs experienced challenges in four critical areas: 1) insufficient intersectoral collaboration within their countries, including limited access to, or a lack of cooperation from, key relevant ministries; 2) inadequate communications, such as deficient information technology systems in place to carry out their functions in a timely fashion; 3) lack of authority to report potential PHEICs; and 4) inadequacies in some resources made available by the WHO, including a key tool - the NFP Guide. Finally, many NFP representatives expressed concern about how WHO uses the information they receive from NFPs. CONCLUSION: Our study, conducted just prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, illustrates key challenges experienced by NFPs that can affect States Parties and WHO performance when outbreaks occur. In order for NFPs to be able to rapidly and successfully communicate potential PHEICs such as COVID-19 in the future, continued measures need to be taken by both WHO and States Parties to ensure NFPs have the necessary authority, capacity, training, and resources to effectively carry out their functions as described in the IHR.

Global health security: the wider lessons from the west African Ebola virus disease epidemic.

The Ebola virus disease outbreak in West Africa was unprecedented in both its scale and impact. Out of this human calamity has come renewed attention to global health security--its definition, meaning, and the practical implications for programmes and policy. For example, how does a government begin to strengthen its core public health capacities, as demanded by the International Health Regulations? What counts as a global health security concern? In the context of the governance of global health, including WHO reform, it will be important to distil lessons learned from the Ebola outbreak. The Lancet invited a group of respected global health practitioners to reflect on these lessons, to explore the idea of global health security, and to offer suggestions for next steps. Their contributions describe some of the major threats to individual and collective human health, as well as the values and recommendations that should be considered to counteract such threats in the future. Many different perspectives are proposed. Their common goal is a more sustainable and resilient society for human health and wellbeing.

Strengthening the International Health Regulations: lessons from the H1N1 pandemic.

The International Health Regulations (2005) [IHR(2005)] represent a potentially revolutionary change in global health governance. The use of the regulations by the World Health Organization (WHO) to respond to the outbreak of pandemic influenza A 2009-H1N1 highlights the importance of the regulations to protecting global health security. As the 2009-H1N1 pandemic illustrated, the IHR(2005) have provided a more robust framework for responding to public health emergencies of international concern (PHEICs), through requiring reporting of serious disease events, strengthening how countries and WHO communicate concerning health threats, empowering the WHO Director-General to declare the existence of PHEICs and to issue temporary recommendations for responding to them, and requiring countries not to implement measures that unnecessarily restrict trade and travel or infringe on human rights. However, limitations to the effectiveness of the IHR(2005) revealed in the 2009-H1N1 pandemic include continuing inadequacies in surveillance and response capacities within some countries, violations of IHR(2005) rules and a potentially narrowing scope of application only to influenza-like pandemic events. These limitations could undermine the IHR(2005)'s potential to contribute to national and global efforts to detect and mitigate future public health emergencies. Support for the IHR(2005) should be broadened and deepened to improve their utility as a tool to strengthen global health security.

Establishing public health security in a postwar Iraq: constitutional obstacles and lessons for other federalizing states.

The public health consequences of the conflict in Iraq will likely continue after the violence has subsided. Reestablishing public health security will require large investments in infrastructure and the creation of effective systems of governance. On the question of governance, the allocation of powers in the new constitution of Iraq is critical. Given the ease with which public health threats cross borders, the constitution needs to grant to the federal government the legal authority to manage such threats and simultaneously meet international requirements. Unfortunately, the draft constitution does not accomplish this objective. If politically possible, the constitution should be amended to provide the federal government with this authority. If not possible, the Iraqi federal government would have two options. It could attempt to use alternative constitutional powers, such as national security powers. This option would be contentious and the results uncertain. Alternatively, the federal government could attempt to establish collaborative relationships with regional governments. Residual sectarian tensions create potential problems for this option, however. Reflecting on the Iraqi situation, we conclude that other federalizing countries emerging from conflict should ensure that their constitutions provide the federal government with the necessary authority to manage threats to public health security effectively.

Managing the pursuit of health and wealth: the key challenges.

This article forms part of a six-part Series on trade and health, and sets the stage for this Series by analysing key aspects of the relationship between trade and health. The Series takes stock of this relation and provides timely analysis of the key challenges facing efforts to achieve an appropriate balance between trade and health across a diverse range of issues. This introductory article reviews how trade and health have risen and expanded on global policy agendas in the past decade in unprecedented ways, describes how trade and health issues are respectively governed in international relations, examines the ongoing search for policy coherence between the two policy spheres, and highlights the topics of the remaining articles in the Series.

Strategies for implementing the new International Health Regulations in federal countries.

The International Health Regulations (IHR), the principal legal instrument guiding the international management of public health emergencies, have recently undergone an extensive revision process. The revised regulations, referred to as the IHR (2005), were unanimously approved in May 2005 by all Member States of the World Health Assembly (WHA) and came into effect on 15 June 2007. The IHR (2005) reflect a modernization of the international community's approach to public health and an acknowledgement of the importance of establishing an effective international strategy to manage emergencies that threaten global health security. The success of the IHR as a new approach to combating such threats will ultimately be determined by the ability of countries to live up to the obligations they assumed in approving the new international strategy. However, doing so may be particularly challenging for decentralized countries, specifically those with federal systems of government. Although the IHR (2005) are the product of an agreement among national governments, they cover a wide range of matters, some of which may not fall fully under the constitutional jurisdiction of the national government within many federations. This tension between the separation of powers within federal systems of government and the requirements of an evolving global public health governance regime may undermine national efforts towards compliance and could ultimately jeopardize the regime's success. We hosted a workshop to examine how federal countries could address some of the challenges they may face in implementing the IHR (2005). We present here a series of recommendations, synthesized from the workshop proceedings, on strategies that these countries might pursue to improve their ability to comply with the revised IHR.

Influenza virus samples, international law, and global health diplomacy.

Indonesia's decision to withhold samples of avian influenza virus A (H5N1) from the World Health Organization for much of 2007 caused a crisis in global health. The World Health Assembly produced a resolution to try to address the crisis at its May 2007 meeting. I examine how the parties to this controversy used international law in framing and negotiating the dispute. Specifically, I analyze Indonesia's use of the international legal principle of sovereignty and its appeal to rules on the protection of biological and genetic resources found in the Convention on Biological Diversity. In addition, I consider how the International Health Regulations 2005 applied to the controversy. The incident involving Indonesia's actions with virus samples illustrates both the importance and the limitations of international law in global health diplomacy.

Through the quarantine looking glass: drug-resistant tuberculosis and public health governance, law, and ethics.

The incident in May-June 2007 involving a U.S. citizen traveling internationally while infected with drug-resistant tuberculosis involved the U.S. federal government's application of its quarantine and isolation powers. The incident and the isolation order raised numerous important issues for public health governance, law, and ethics. This article explores many of these issues by examining how the exercise of quarantine powers provides a powerful lens through which to understand how societies respond to and attempt to govern threats posed by dangerous, contagious pathogens. The article considers historical aspects of governmental power to quarantine and isolate individuals and groups; analyzes the current state of quarantine and isolation law in the United States in light of the recent incident with drug-resistant tuberculosis; and explores global aspects of public health governance and law highlighted by this incident.